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4 Propagation of the Depression
Theories and Evidence
James S. Fackler 
University of Kentucky
Despite the fact that it has been more than six decades since the 
onset of the Great Depression, the factors involved in propagating this 
dramatic decline in economic activity remain subjects of debate and 
interest. My objective is 1) to review the received wisdom on how the 
Great Depression evolved through time, and 2) to reintroduce into the 
discussion one of the original theories of the Depression that has been 
subjected to relatively little empirical analysis, the debt-deflation 
hypothesis. 1
Let me emphasize that my objective is to discuss the "propagation 
mechanism" operative in the early 1930s rather than to try to isolate the 
initiating factor(s) for the Great Depression. I omit lengthy discussion 
of the initial impulse only to keep the current discussion manageable 
and not because it is inherently less interesting or important.
Until fairly recently, the received wisdom on the propagation 
mechanism included two schools of thought. The first, developed by 
Friedman and Schwartz (1963) and now called the "money view" 
explanation, argues that inappropriate monetary policy caused what 
otherwise would have been a (perhaps severe) recession to become the 
Great Depression. The second, derived from Temin (1976), argues that 
the impetus for the Depression was the autonomous behavior of con 
sumption.
Recently, a new view of the Depression has emerged. Bernanke 
(1983) has augmented the money view analysis with what is now 
called the "credit view." The credit-view model demonstrates how a 
deflationary shock can disrupt the credit intermediation process and 
cause a sustained decline in output. Specifically, deflation lowers the 
net worth of borrowers by raising their real indebtedness. If the defla 
tion is sufficiently severe, debtor insolvency jeopardizes the financial 
condition of creditors (banks), increasing the fragility of the credit
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intermediation process. If bank failures result, local "information cap 
ital" on the quality of borrowers is lost, raising the cost of credit inter 
mediation and lowering economic efficiency. 2
THE BEHAVIOR OF OUTPUT
Figure 1 shows the behavior of output (measured as monthly levels 
of industrial production) over most of the inter-war period. This longer 
period provides a background against which to evaluate the time period 
of interest for present purposes, August 1929 to March 1933. As is evi 
dent, industrial production declined precipitously over this three-and- 
a-half-year period. Whatever the initial impulse, the objective here is 
to describe and evaluate the dynamics (i.e., the propagation mecha 
nism) in the economy that caused this impulse to have its prolonged 
effect.
The path of output displayed in Figure 1 suppresses potentially 
important parts of the story. Specifically, the focus is on the behavior 
of a single, aggregate measure of output. An expanded analysis would 
also investigate the interactions among the components of this single 
measure of output; that is, attention would be paid to the "comove- 
ment" of output across sectors of the economy. For example, interest 
ing elements of the story revolve around the agricultural and housing 
sectors. Unfortunately, time does not permit detailed analysis of sec 
toral interactions.
THEORIES OF THE PROPAGATION MECHANISM
The Money View
One time-honored interpretation of the decline in output that began 
in the fall of 1929 is the money view of Friedman and Schwartz 
(1963). Their argument proceeds by first building a statistical case, 
using roughly a century's worth of data, that changes in the money 
stock cause subsequent changes in output. Second, beginning in late
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Figure 1 Industrial Production Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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1929 and accelerating in late 1930, declines in the money supply 
occurred due to what they referred to as the "inept" response of offi 
cials of the Federal Reserve System to the emerging crisis (Figure 2). 3 
The Friedman-Schwartz argument is that the Depression was both 
deeper and more prolonged than need be due to this inappropriate 
monetary policy.4 Finally, a contributing factor was the fall in wealth 
of both bank shareholders and depositors associated with widespread 
bank failures. Among other effects, these wealth shocks likely contrib 
uted to falling demands for consumption goods, further contributing to 
the downward spiral in production.
While the sharp decline in output certainly accompanies the dra 
matic fall in the money stock, a deeper look at the data suggests that 
the links between money and output may be decidedly more complex. 
In particular, the stock of money in the economy is the result of inter 
actions among the Federal Reserve, the banking sector, and the non- 
bank public. The Fed sets the quantity of base money (5) in the 
economy. The banking system and the nonbank public then use this
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monetary base to produce the money supply (Ml). A "bare bones" 
expression of this relationship is the money multiplier model:
Ml =m*B, 
where the money multiplier is
m = (1 + c)l(rd + e + c)
with rd being the required reserve ratio for demand deposits, with c 
being the ratio of currency to demand deposits (C/D) held by the pub 
lic, and with e being the ratio of excess reserves to demand deposit lia 
bilities (ER/D) held by banks. Note that the money supply is 
determined in part by Fed policy that sets the required reserve ratio and 
the monetary base, in part by banks as they choose the quantity of 
excess reserves to hold relative to deposit liabilities, and in part by the 
nonbank public as it chooses the level of currency to hold relative to 
deposits.
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The money multiplier model suggests an investigation of the base 
and the multiplier separately. Figure 3 shows the behavior of the base 
over the inter-war period. Notice in particular the modest (relative to 
the decline in money) decline in the base over the 1928-1930 period. 
Figure 4 shows the money multiplier, m, which declined dramatically 
over the first three years of the Depression. This decline was driven by 
a rising excess reserve ratio, as banks struggled to maintain liquidity in 
the face of the possibility of bank runs, and by a rising currency- 
deposit ratio, as the nonbank public, fearing instability of the banking 
system in general and the possibility of the failure of their own banks 
in particular, preferred to hold currency rather than deposits. 5
Do Figures 3 and 4 mean that the Friedman-Schwartz hypothesis, 
that the fall in the money stock was due to inept policy, is incorrect? 
Not necessarily, since the rises in the ratios of currency and excess 
reserves to deposits may reflect a lack of public confidence in Fed pol 
icies. The Fed, after all, could have chosen to flood the financial mar 
ket with money, though perhaps at the cost of giving up alternative 
policy goals.
The initial impression from Figures 2 to 4 is that the Friedman- 
Schwartz money view certainly appears consistent with the data. But 
since advanced economies are complex, other hypotheses may also be 
supported by the data as well. We now turn to two popular alternatives.
Autonomous Spending Shocks
The second of the time-honored hypotheses about the propagation 
mechanism is due to Temin (1976), who argued that the impetus for the 
Depression was the autonomous behavior of consumption. In his view, 
the Depression began as a recession, which was brought about by a 
variety of factors. First, there was an oversupply in the housing mar 
ket. Second, financial markets were uneasy because of the stock mar 
ket boom and the Federal Reserve's efforts to burst this speculative 
bubble. These forces led to a fall in income. The stock market crash in 
October 1929 was an additional major force leading to the economic 
collapse. In Temin's view, the crash propagated its deflationary effect 
through consumption, which was in part depressed due to the decline 
in consumer wealth and an increase in consumer leverage. 6 But even 
after considering the magnitudes of the negative effects of lower
100 Fackler











1921 1924 1827 1930 1933 1938










1921 1321 1927 1930 1333 1936
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wealth, increased leverage, potentially pessimistic expectations, and 
deflationary shocks from the agricultural sector of the United States, 
there is still a large portion of the fall in consumption in 1929 that 
Temin considered unexplained or "autonomous." He states (Temin 
1976, p. 83): "It is somewhat unsatisfactory to say that the Depression 
was started by an unexplained event, but this alternative is preferable to 
statements that are inconsistent with the data." Thus, he claimed that 
nonmonetary and nonfinancial forces played the primary causal role in 
the Depression.7
In contrast to Friedman and Schwartz, Temin views the behavior of 
money as responding to, but not causing, the economic decline; for 
Temin, money is a passive, endogenous variable. Specifically, he 
argues that "there is no evidence of any effective deflationary pressure 
from the banking system between the stock market crash in October 
1929 and the British abandonment of the gold standard in September 
1931" (Temin 1976, p. 169). Temin reached this conclusion because 
short-term interest rates fell, contrary to what would be expected dur 
ing a period of monetary stringency. He argued further that the 
approximate constancy of the real money supply throughout this period 
hardly signals that contractionary movements in output are the 
response to monetary tightening. 8
Romer (1988) has recently revisited the issue of the aberrant 
behavior of consumption in the early stages of the Depression. Consis 
tent with the results of Mishkin (1978) and Temin, Romer argues that 
neither wealth nor income effects can account for all of the fall in con 
sumption. Rather, her hypothesis is that the drop in consumption was 
the result of increased uncertainty during 1929. 9
She concludes that "uncertainty effects due to stock market vari 
ability can explain most of the unusual behavior of consumer spending 
on durable and semidurable goods in the first year and a half of the 
Great Depression" (p. 29). That is, the stock market crash made con 
sumers sufficiently uncertain of the future to induce them to decrease 
their consumption, and thus provided an impetus for the initial fall in 
economic activity in 1929 that marked the beginning of the Depres 
sion. She also provides contemporary accounts from business fore 
casters that suggest the uncertainty persisted well into 1930. 10
Romer's analysis suggests that a substantial portion of the drop in 
consumption was due to increasing uncertainty about the state of the
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economy. Further, this decline in consumption may account for some 
of what Temin viewed as "autonomous." For the consumption expla 
nation of the propagation mechanism to be plausible, some type of 
proxy showing increased consumer uncertainty should be available. 
Figure 5 shows a measure of uncertainty: changes in the 12-month 
moving variance of stock prices. As expected, near the end of 1929, 
these changes become much more pronounced. Further, the plausibil 
ity of the argument that consumption declines were the primary driving 
force for the tailspin in output in the early 1930s would be enhanced 
with evidence that monetary policy was not unusually restrictive. Fol 
lowing Temin's argument, Figure 6 shows the interest yield on Trea 
sury securities maturing in three to six months, and at first glance it 
provides support for Temin's claim that monetary policy was not 
"tight" at the outset of the Depression. Specifically, after the rise in 
rates engineered in 1928 by Fed officials concerned with stock market 
speculation, rates began to fall well in advance of the outset of the 
downturn and continued to fall through the middle of 1931. 11 Taken 
together, the casual evidence in Figures 5 and 6 does not obviously dis 
count the hypothesis that consumption shocks played an important role 
in the decline in output.
Debt-Deflation and the Credit View
The debt-deflation hypothesis originated with Fisher (1933), who 
argued that there are two dominant factors that account for the "great" 
booms and depressions: overindebtedness and deflation. To see the 
mechanics by which debt-deflation operates, consider first some initial 
level of nominal debt. A "small" negative price shock raises the real 
obligation of the debtor. At the same time, the creditor is being repaid 
in dollars with higher real value. Under the usual assumption that dis 
tributional effects are at most of second-order importance, little macro- 
economic effect is predicted. Next, assume an initial state of 
overindebtedness. A sufficiently large price decline forces debtors into 
insolvency; nominal incomes fall along with prices, so that not only 
does the real value of the debt obligation rise, the ability to service the 
debt declines. In the event of bankruptcy of the debtor, the creditor (a 
bank, for example), ends up owning the asset. The bank, with a given 
level of nominal liabilities (deposits), finds itself in possession of
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Figure 5 Change in the 12-Month Moving Variance of Stock Prices, 
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assets whose prices are falling and which are costly to sell. The 
decline in prices may lower the nominal value of (illiquid) assets below 
this nominal value of liabilities, forcing insolvency onto the bank as 
well. As banks find their balance sheets becoming increasingly precar 
ious, they may respond by raising the fraction of their assets held in the 
form of "safe" assets (excess reserves and government securities), low 
ering funds available for loans. Further, as bank balance sheets deteri 
orate, concerned depositors may withdraw funds from the bank, 
increasing its vulnerability to a "run." Thus, "excessive" debt com 
bined with deflation may both lower wealth and jeopardize the credit 
intermediation process, contributing to a downward spiral in output 
and prices. If a bank fails, information capital in the form of special 
ized knowledge about borrowers by local creditors is lost. 12
If debt-deflation is to explain at least part of the path of output dur 
ing the Depression, then two important conditions would need to hold. 
First, there should be evidence of overindebtedness, so that price 
declines can have the potential of raising real obligations enough to 
cause a wave of bankruptcies. Second, there should be evidence that a 
major part of the deflation of the early 1930s was unanticipated at the 
time agents assumed debt, either in the open market or in the form of 
bank loans. 13
Was there an "excessive" debt build-up prior to the onset of the 
Depression? This is a difficult question to assess. Fisher recognized 
the complexity of the issue when he noted that overindebtedness is 
always measured relative to a variable such as wealth or income and 
that overindebtedness depends in part on the maturity structure of the 
debt. Further, the assessment may be complicated when relative mea 
sures give conflicting evidence on a debt build-up. 14 Some evidence 
does support the existence of a relatively large rise in debt. First, 
according to Clark (1933), in the early 1930s the ratio of debt service 
to national income rose from 9 percent in 1929 to 20 percent in 1932- 
1933. Second, Persons (1930) reported that urban real estate debt rose 
by nearly 150 percent between 1920 and 1929, from about $11 billion 
to $27 billion. Further, he notes that the $16 billion increase exceeds 
by $5 billion "the entire debt of this character amassed in all the earlier 
years of our urban development." Third, issuance of corporate bonds 
and notes rose from $26 billion in 1920 to $47 billion in 1928.
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The second issue, whether there was unanticipated deflation, has 
been the subject of recent literature, which is currently divided regard 
ing whether the deflation was anticipated or not. The data on whole 
sale and consumer prices are plotted in Figures 7 and 8. Note that 
there was some precedent for deflation, as the data for 1921 show; 
agents would not need long memories to allow for the expectation of 
deflation. However, prices for most of the decade appear stationary, 
albeit with some variability. The most recent data, for agents assessing 
price trends as the end of the decade of the 1920s approached, may 
have suggested continued price stability.
Hamilton (1987, 1992) and Dominguez, Fair, and Shapiro (1988) 
present empirical evidence consistent with the view that the deflation 
was unanticipated. However, Cecchetti (1992) critiques Hamilton's 
findings and concludes that once deflation started, people expected it to 
continue. Nelson (1991) presents an extensive and detailed examina 
tion of the statements of business commentators from April 1929 
through December 1930. He concludes that the business press antici 
pated deflation.
While the debt-deflation mechanism can explain a decline in out 
put over the course of a business cycle, can it alone account for the 
massive decline in output experienced in the 1930s? Using the debt- 
deflation hypothesis as a point of departure, Bernanke (1983) presented 
a new explanation of the experience of the U.S. economy in the early 
1930s. In Bernanke's credit-view theory, credit became unavailable for 
all but the very safest loan prospects, and that disrupted economic 
activity by eliminating sources of financing for both investment and 
production. Once the combination of overindebtedness and deflation 
raised problems of debtor insolvency, "the disruption of the financial 
sector by the banking and debt crises raised the real cost of intermedia 
tion between lenders and certain classes of borrowers" (p. 263). Banks 
became unwilling to loan to all but the most creditworthy customers, 
effectively forcing borrowers without access to other sources of credit 
to lower their levels of economic activity. As banks (and other credi 
tors) engage in a "flight to safety," lending only to the safest prospects 
and not at all to others, the interest rate spread between "risky" and 
"safe" loans will widen substantially. This implication is supported in 
the data, as demonstrated in Figure 9, where the spread more than tri 
pled in the early 1930s.
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Figure 7 Wholesale Price Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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Figure 8 U.S. Cost of Living Index, January 1921 to December 1937 
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Figure 9 Baa Interest Rate Minus Government Bond Interest Rate, 
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In the money view, it is the liability side of the balance sheet of the 
banking system, reflecting the quantity of money, that determines eco 
nomic activity and prices. The asset side, and in particular how bank 
portfolios are allocated between securities and loans, is irrelevant to 
economic outcomes. In the credit view, banks are important not only 
because their liabilities serve as the medium of exchange, but also 
because banks specialize in lending to agents who would find open- 
market borrowing prohibitively expensive. Thus, a monetary policy 
that lowers reserves works not only because of the upward pressure on 
interest rates, as argued by money-view proponents, but also because 
some borrowers do not have alternative sources of funds as bank lend 
ing declines; if bank loans fall, some agents cannot obtain funds else 
where. The corresponding decline in spending then complements the 
interest-rate effect of the restrictive monetary policy.
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HOW IMPORTANT IS EACH THEORY OF THE 
PROPAGATION MECHANISM?
The analysis of the previous section suggests that the various 
hypotheses that purport to explain the downward spiral in output are 
not only plausible, but appear consistent with a casual look at the data. 
Let me caution, however, that we need not necessarily look at these 
hypotheses as competing with one another. One theory may explain 
events over one time period (for example, consumption shocks may 
explain events just after the stock market crash) and another over the 
next time period (for example, credit shocks may explain events subse 
quent to bank panics). And some may complement each other during a 
given period (such as debt-deflation and disruptions to the credit inter 
mediation process). The results of a more sophisticated analysis are 
now examined in the hope that they will allow at least tentative 
answers to the question posed in the title of this section. 15
I have analyzed a model of the U.S. macroeconomy for the inter- 
war period that incorporates each of the hypotheses outlined in the pre 
vious section. As indicated in the introduction, I ignore explicit con 
sideration of international events. Viewing the U.S. experience in 
isolation, while perhaps controversial to some, has as an important pre 
cedent recent work by Romer (1993). She argues that, at least until the 
fall of 1931, domestic factors were the cause of the drop in U.S. output, 
rather than international constraints. 16 In particular, Federal Reserve 
policy decisions (from the tightening in 1928 to curb what was seen as 
excessive stock market speculation to the failure to counteract banking 
panics in 1930 and in both the spring and fall of 1931), rather than 
international events, were likely of primary importance in explaining 
the drop in U.S. production.
Monthly data over the period from January 1921 to December 
1937 are used so as to study the Depression era in the broader context 
of the inter-war period. The data employed are the rate on U.S. gov 
ernment bonds, the Ml measure of money, industrial output, the 
wholesale price index, bank loans made for purposes other than securi 
ties purchases, the spread between the Baa bond rate and the govern 
ment bond rate, the real liabilities of failing banks, and the par value of 
outstanding bonds.
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While most of these data are well known and require no additional 
discussion, the loan series and the bond series require some comment. 
The loan data represent total loans by banks in 101 leading cities net of 
loans made by banks on securities. By netting out loans made on secu 
rities, the resulting loan series should correspond closely to loans made 
for commercial and industrial purposes, the relevant concept for an 
evaluation of the credit view of policy. 17 Note that it is not possible to 
derive a consistent net loan series after 1937, which thus determines 
the ending point for the sample.
The outstanding bond series is intended to represent indebtedness 
of borrowers with access to open-market sources of finance. This 
series is derived by Hickman (1953) and represents the stock of out 
standing corporate bonds of railroads, public utilities, and industrial 
firms. The basic data were annual, with monthly data derived by Hick 
man by adjusting the data for which the month of issue was known so 
that their sum equaled the annual total. Since the months of issue of 
about 95 percent of total par amounts are known, the monthly data 
should be accurate. In addition, Hickman provides a detailed compari 
son of this debt series with those available from other major sources, 
including the Commercial and Financial Chronicle and the Journal of 
Commerce. He is able to reconcile his data with that contained in these 
alternative sources, so that Hickman's degree of confidence in these 
data is high; see Appendix C in Hickman (1953) for detail.
The final data issues of importance relate to the interest rates 
series. First, the government bond rate represents a "safe" interest rate 
on U.S. bonds with 12 or more years to maturity or call date. Second, 
the interest rate spread is intended to proxy for the difference between 
the loan rate at banks for bank-constrained borrowers and a safe market 
rate. Note, however, that the Baa rate corresponds to borrowers who 
have access to open market sources of funds, so that the spread is far 
from a perfect measure of the concept it is intended to measure. How 
ever, due to problems associated with adverse selection, moral hazard, 
and credit rationing, the spread between the loan rate series on bank 
lending and the safe government bond rate may not adequately mea 
sure the premium required by banks to lend to "good" risks. Bernanke 
(1983) represents a precedent for using the interest rate spread em 
ployed here.
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The model estimated and analyzed is a variant of a standard text 
book aggregate demand (AD) and aggregate supply (AS) presentation 
of the macro economy. Underlying the AD schedule are augmented 
versions of the IS and the LM schedules. The usual specifications are 
augmented to account for the market for bank loans and for the volume 
of open-market credit. The IS curve represents, inter alia, the behavior 
of consumption and investment decisions. 18 The IS curve includes as 
arguments bank loans, real open-market debt obligations, and the inter 
est rate spread; these variables are intended to capture the debt-defla 
tion/credit-view impacts on the demand for goods and services. The 
money demand equation underlying the LM schedule includes deposits 
in failing banks as a variable that represents portfolio shifts undertaken 
by agents in response to bank failures or panics. That is, the money 
demand equation includes a proxy for shifts between deposits and cur 
rency that alters the money multiplier, as in the money view. The 
money supply equation underlying the LM schedule includes real 
open-market obligations, bank loans, and the interest rate spread. 
These variables are intended to capture the effects of changes in the 
credit intermediation process on the supply of money, as in the credit 
view. The money supply curve also includes deposits in failing banks 
in an effort to account for the effect of bank failures, as a proxy for the 
excess reserve ratio on the money supply, as in the money view. The 
financial sector is completed with demand and supply equations for 
bank loans, as well as equations explaining bank failures as depending 
on financial distress, as in the credit view, and the volume of open-mar 
ket credit. Finally, a relatively simple aggregate supply curve is speci 
fied; its distinguishing feature is the inclusion of deposits in failing 
banks as an explanatory variable to take into account the effect of a 
decline in working capital on production.
The model described above is analyzed in the following way. Each 
variable in the model contains two parts: a systematic or predictable 
component and a random component or error term. The systematic 
component can be thought of as the "predicted" or "forecast" part of 
the variable; this component represents the "best information" the 
agent has about the future path of the variable, given the model struc 
ture. The random component represents the deviation between the 
actual data and the systematic or forecast component. 19 Finally, the 
model is dynamic, so that random shocks to a variable one period can
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alter the path of other variables over time. By way of terminology, 
breaking down output into its systematic and random components is 
referred to as a "historical decomposition."
As an example of the general procedure outlined in the previous 
paragraph, consider industrial production ("output"). At a point in 
time, output can be forecast into the future; this is the systematic com 
ponent. The error in the forecast—the difference between the forecast 
and the actual path of output—is due to unforeseen shocks in the econ 
omy; this is the random component. This forecast error in output can 
be the result of a variety of shocks to other variables in the economy. 
For example, if banks unexpectedly alter their lending preferences and 
stop lending to some firms, as in the credit view, then output may fall 
relative to the forecast level if firms cannot obtain enough working cap 
ital to finance production. Or, if consumers unexpectedly slow their 
purchases, firms may reduce production to avoid unwanted inventory 
build-up. In general, shocks to all variables can have some effect on 
output.
To see the relative importance of various factors for the path of 
output, begin by considering Figure 10, which shows the forecast or 
"base projection" of industrial production, a 95 percent confidence 
band around the base projection, and the actual path of this measure of 
output. Given the model parameters, the base projection represents the 
path for industrial production that would have been predicted in a fore 
cast made at the beginning of October 1929. Visually, the base projec 
tion completely fails to capture any of the general pattern of actual 
movements in industrial production. Statistically, for the entire period, 
the root mean squared error (RMSE) between the base projection and 
actual industrial production is 40.8 (Table 1).
The remaining figures present two types of visual evidence on the 
difference between the base projection and the actual behavior of out 
put. First, the figures provide a way to see whether the error compo 
nent in some particular variable explains the difference between the 
base projection of output and its actual level. Second, the figures allow 
us to form impressions on whether these errors help reproduce the 
"characteristic phases" (i.e., the turning points and rates of growth) of 
actual output during various subperiods, even in the absence of closing 
the gap between the forecast and the actual path of industrial produc 
tion. The major phases of interest begin with the period between Octo-
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Figure 10 Industrial Production Index, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Table 1 Root Mean Squared Errors for Historical Contributions of 
Selected Variables Relative to Actual Output
Variable(s)
Base projection (BP)
BP + money supply shocks
BP + IS shocks
BP + deflation shocks
BP + bank loan shocks
+ interest rate
differential shocks
BP + IS shocks
+ money supply shocks
BP + IS shocks
+ deflation
BP + IS shocks
+ bank loan shocks
+ interest rate
differential shocks
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+ money supply shocks 
+ deflation shocks
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ber 1929 and January 1931 when the U.S. economy went into a deep, 
but not historically unprecedented, recession. From February 1931 
through May 1931, the economy flattened out. Then output went into a 
tailspin from June 1931 through July 1932. There was an incipient 
recovery from August 1932 until October 1932, which was followed by 
a collapse that hit the bottom in March 1933. The remainder of 1933 
displayed a sharp "spike," in that a rapid recovery began in April, 
peaked in July, and declined to the end of the year.
Figure 11 shows the contribution to the base projection of the 
errors to the money stock, and so approximately corresponds to the 
money view advanced by Friedman and Schwartz. This figure sug 
gests that the money supply shocks contributed to declines in output 
throughout 1930 and again in late 1931. With the exception of a slight 
uptick in output in early 1930 rather than a relatively flat path for actual 
output, these patterns are not obviously at odds with the tightening of 
policy in the late 1920s and the panics in the early 1930s. However, 
accounting for the money stock errors does little to close the gap 
between actual output and its forecast path. A quantitative assessment 
of the role of money supply shocks in determining the path of output is 
presented in Table 1, where the RMSE of the base projection plus the 
contribution of money is 35.7 for the entire period, a reduction of 12.5 
percent from the base projection of industrial production alone. Note, 
however, that for the initial stages of the Depression, i.e., the period 
from the stock market crash through September 1931, the percentage 
improvement in the RMSE is about 20 percent (an RMSE of 19.4 vs. 
24.1).
Figure 12 shows the contribution to the base projection of shocks 
to the IS curve. Note that while this figure is in the spirit of Temin, the 
factors underlying this chart are much broader than those in his origi 
nal hypothesis. In particular, the shocks underlying the IS curve 
include, in addition to consumption shocks, shocks to investment and 
shocks from elsewhere in the world. 20 With this caveat, it should none 
theless be noted that the IS shocks underlying the early months in Fig 
ure 12 are unlikely to be due to exports; exports rose by about 3 percent 
between 1928 and 1929, and real exports were a relatively small frac 
tion of GNP. As is evident from Figure 12, over the first several 
months after the stock market crash, IS shocks roughly mimic the mon 
etary shocks displayed in Figure 11, showing an initial decline fol-
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Figure 11 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Money Supply, 
October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 12 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve, 
October 1929 to December 1933 
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lowed by a modest rise in early 1930. From mid 1930 on, however, IS 
shocks appear to provide a more complete explanation of both the 
actual path of output and the characteristic phases of output during the 
Depression era. More precisely, the results reported in Table 1 show 
that the IS shocks nearly halve the RMSE of the base projection for the 
period ending in December 1933. These IS shocks also dominate the 
monetary shock explanation for the initial phase of the Depression, but 
not nearly so completely as for the entire period. For the initial phase, 
the RMSE of the base projection falls from 24.1 to 17.0, a 30 percent 
improvement. Note, however, that most of the improvement relative to 
the monetary explanation appears to occur after late 1930, so the initial 
months of the Depression don't seem to be dominated by either theory.
Figure 13 shows the ability of the debt-deflation hypothesis to 
account for the path of output. Note that this plot represents the effects 
of deflation without the complementary effects associated with the 
credit view; independent shocks associated with the credit view are 
discussed below. However, compared with the monetary explanation, 
deflation surprises provide some explanatory power for the path of out 
put, especially over the entire period. The notable aspect of this figure 
is that, unlike the results displayed in Figures 10, 11, and 12, the defla 
tion shocks do not produce a path in which output rises in late 1929 
and early 1930. The RMSE associated with the initial two years of the 
Depression is 18.2, midway between those for money and IS shocks. 
For the period ending in December 1933, the RMSE for the base pro 
jection plus the effects of deflation surprises is 30.9.
Figure 14 provides a representation of the credit view, where 
shocks to the market for bank loans and the interest rate differential are 
combined with the base projection of output. Visual inspection sug 
gests that, like shocks to the IS curve but unlike the monetary and 
deflation explanations, the credit view reasonably captures the charac 
teristic phases of the period. Notice in particular that industrial pro 
duction tends to fall in periods following banking panics in this plot, 
consistent with firms being forced to lower production due to drops in 
the availability of working capital. However, as reported in Table 1, 
the credit view explains less of the scale effects of the Depression than 
does the debt-deflation hypothesis, with a full period RMSE of 33.3 
and an initial period RMSE of 24.2. Of particular interest to credit- 
view proponents should be the declines in output accounted for by
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Figure 13 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Deflation, 
October 1929 to December 1933 











1930 1931 1932 1933
Figure 14 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + Loans and 
Interest Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933 
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shocks in the bank loan market around the first and second banking 
panics in late 1930 and mid 1931, and the accounting for rising output 
following the bank holiday in 1933.
Given that shocks to the IS curve generate the lowest RMSEs and 
most accurately capture the characteristic phases of the Depression 
over the full horizon, the remaining charts investigate the joint abilities 
of shocks to the IS curve and other explanations of the Depression to 
account for the path of output.
Consider Figure 15, which shows the joint contributions of shocks 
to the IS curve and the money supply; roughly, this plot represents the 
combined effects of the time-honored explanations of Temin and 
Friedman and Schwartz. Compared with Figure 12, the addition of 
money tends to bring the projected path of industrial production some 
what closer to the actual path. Specifically, as reported in Table 1, the 
RMSE of the base projection plus both IS shocks and money supply 
shocks is 17.7 for the full period, in contrast to an RMSE of 21.8 for 
the contribution of IS shocks alone; thus, the addition of money supply 
shocks lowers the RMSE by about 19 percent relative to the RMSE 
associated with IS shocks alone. Roughly the same percentage 
improvement occurs during the first two years of the Depression.
Figure 16 shows the joint contributions of IS and deflation shocks. 
As compared with Figure 12, the inclusion of deflationary shocks 
allows a closer description of the path of output than do just the IS 
shocks. This appearance is confirmed in Table 1, where the RMSE for 
the projected path relative to the actual path is 14.2 for the full period 
and where it is 11.9 for the initial phase of the Depression.
Figure 17 combines the base projection with shocks to the IS curve 
and the variables associated with the credit view. Unlike previously 
described alternatives, the output decline is noticeably faster after the 
second banking panic in 1931 and most closely parallels the upward 
spike in output after the 1933 bank holiday. However, this combina 
tion of IS shocks with the credit view shocks does not provide much 
initial explanatory power for the early part of the Depression. Thus, 
the RMSE for this combination is 17.1 over the first two years of the 
era (about the same as for IS shocks alone) but is 16.8 for the entire 
period.
Finally, Figure 18 combines the deflationary shocks associated 
with the debt-deflation hypothesis with those from the money view and
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Figure 15 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve + 
Money Supply, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 16 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve 
Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 17 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve +
Loans and Rate Differential, October 1929 to December 1933 
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Figure 18 Industrial Production Index, Base Projection + IS Curve + 
Money Supply + Deflation, October 1929 to December 1933 
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the autonomous shocks influencing the IS curve. While not capturing 
all of the Depression, the implied multicausal view of propagation of 
the Depression does capture most of the drop in output and closely 
describes the characteristic phases of the period, with the exception of 
the early months of 1930.
CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions emerge from this analysis. First, for the 
period as a whole, there does not appear to be a single, dominant expla 
nation of the Depression; no factor alone can explain both the magni 
tude of the decline in output along with the characteristic phases of the 
Depression. Overall, the factor that does the "best" at explaining the 
various facts is the shock term to the IS curve. This term probably rep 
resents consumption early in the horizon, but later also probably 
reflects shocks to investment, fiscal policy, and external events.
Second, as indicated in Table 1, among shocks to the individual 
equations, those to the IS curve produce the lowest RMSE over the two 
years following the stock market crash. However, as was visually evi 
dent from Figures 11 to 14, only the debt-deflation hypothesis, as 
embedded in deflation surprises, suggested a downward path for output 
at the onset of the Depression. In fact, the RMSE for the base projec 
tion alone for the first year following the crash was 12.8. Among the 
various theories, only the RMSE associated with the debt-deflation 
hypothesis (10.6) shows a noticeable drop in the RMSE through Sep 
tember 1930; the RMSE associated with money was 12.6, with IS 
shocks was 13.2, and with shocks to the bank loan market was 13.0. 
This result seems to suggest that further investigation of the role of 
deflationary surprises may be warranted.
Third, the credit view that disruptions to the market for bank loans 
help explain the depth and length of the Depression is consistent with 
the data presented here. Specifically, the credit view seems to work 
well in explaining the rate of decline in output around the banking pan 
ics in the early 1930s.
Fourth, note that the credit view appears to contain explanatory 
power over the period from the stock market crash through the end of
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1933, even in the presence of money shocks. This result stands in 
some contrast to that of Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz, who argue 
that for an earlier period, the evidence for the credit view is weakened 
by the presence of the money stock.
Notes
This research was supported by a Summer Research Grant from the College of Busi 
ness and Economics of the University of Kentucky. The grant was made possible by a 
donation of funds to the College by Ashland Oil, Inc.
1. This theory was first proposed by Irving Fisher (1933). Recently, Calomiris and 
Hubbard (1989) and Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz (1992) have addressed 
some of the issues that arise in debt-deflation. Calomiris and Hubbard estimated a 
"credit view" model of the 1884-1909 period; Bordo, Rappoport, and Schwartz 
investigated "hybrid credit view" and "hybrid money view" models that attempt to 
sort out the relative roles of money and credit for economic activity over 1880- 
1914, a period that encompasses the Calomiris-Hubbard period. In contrast to 
these papers, the focus of this paper is (most of) the inter-war period, 1921-1937.
2. Eichengreen (1992) has argued that the breakdown of the gold standard that had 
governed international monetary arrangements prior to World War I and again 
over the first part of the inter-war period was the driving force behind the sharp 
and protracted decline in output. I do not address this explanation for the propa 
gation mechanism explicitly. However, as argued by Bernanke (1994), the "com 
parative approach" to understanding the Depression stimulated by the rise and fall 
of the gold standard in the inter-war period enhances the confidence in model 
identification when assessing the Depression experience of an individual country.
3. The data plotted in Figure 2 are for the Ml stock of money. A plot of M2 shows 
the same pattern of steep declines over the early 1920s.
4. Recent support for this hypothesis is presented by Schwartz (1981) and McCal- 
lum (1990). Schwartz presents Granger-causality tests consistent with the 
hypothesis of unidirectional causality from money to income during the Depres 
sion. McCallum demonstrates with counterfactual simulations that a monetary 
base rule aimed at keeping nominal GNP growing smoothly at a noninflationary 
rate would have avoided most of the decline in output during the 1930s. However, 
other evidence suggests that there remains room for additional explanations. For 
example, Gordon and Wilcox (1981) argue that money does not play an important 
role in the decline in output in the initial stages of the Depression. Burbidge and 
Harrison (1985) report similar results.
5. Recall that deposit insurance was not introduced until later in the decade.
6. Mishkin (1978) discusses the effect on wealth of the stock market crash. It seems 
clear that consumption in 1929 was adversely affected by the crash.
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7. Recent research supportive of Temin's view is provided by Romer (1988) and 
Flacco and Parker (1992), who argue that consumption fell due to increased 
uncertainty. Support for the premise of increased uncertainty is included in Nel 
son (1991), who documents accounts from the contemporary business press. 
Arguments attempting to refute the basic Temin hypothesis are included in Mayer 
(1978), Meltzer (1976), and Hamilton (1987).
8. Hamilton (1987) convincingly demonstrated that monetary policy was contrac 
tionary as early as January 1928. It follows that Temin must implicitly believe 
that monetary policy does not operate with a lag in its effect on real economic 
activity in order for the thrust of his nonmonetary arguments to go through. 
Moreover, if this is not believed, "much of the substance of Temin's objection dis 
appears" (Hamilton 1987, p. 155). Given a constant real money stock and falling 
nominal interest rates, Hamilton also concludes that Temin's position—that shifts 
in the IS curve are more important than shifts in the LM curve—"seems to be little 
more than an a priori specification that the parameters are such that monetary pol 
icy was unlikely to exert much of an effect on the economy anyway" (p. 158).
9. Romer's discussion of uncertainty is in terms of its impact on consumption and at 
face value may be viewed as supportive of the Temin explanation of the Depres 
sion. However, Romer's analysis is also consistent with other explanations of the 
Depression, since what matters is the impact of uncertainty on consumption rather 
than the source of the uncertainty.
10. There are, of course, many reasons other than stock market volatility that can 
explain why uncertainty would have persisted beyond 1929 and increased subse 
quent to mid 1930. Events such as massive unanticipated deflation, the Hawley- 
Smoot tariffs, Federal Reserve inaction, excessive government optimism, political 
dissension over the proper economic course, the doubling of tax rates in 1932, the 
failure of the Bank of the United States, the collapse of the Kredit-anstalt in Aus 
tria, Britain's departure from the gold standard, and the near complete collapse of 
the U.S. financial system are some sources of uncertainty that could well have 
kept consumption depressed for the entire October 1929-March 1933 period. 
Indeed, increasing uncertainty may have been pervasive up until March 1933, 
when the government finally stepped in.
11. Note, of course, that the plot shows a nominal rate of interest. If the rate of defla 
tion is high, then real rates may be high even though nominal rates are low. If the 
ultimate impact of monetary policy on the economy is through real rates of inter 
est, then low nominal interest rates can be consistent with restrictive monetary 
policy.
12. In Fisher's analysis, other factors such as the quantity of money, its velocity, busi 
ness confidence, and interest rates play secondary roles in the propagation of eco 
nomic fluctuations.
13. Suppose for a moment that the deflation is anticipated. Rational borrowers and 
lenders would take the anticipated deflation into account when drafting the loan 
contract. This might take the form of specifying the repayment schedule in real 
terms (e.g., adjusting the loan payments for movements in a broadly based price
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index such as the consumer price index) or altering the term to maturity of the 
loan (e.g., arranging for repayment to be complete prior to the onset of the defla 
tion if it is expected to occur some reasonable amount of time in the future), or 
some other type of arrangement. That is, presumably most of the debt burden 
leading to insolvency and bankruptcy can be avoided if the deflation is foreseen,
14. As a contemporary example, consider the evidence presented in Bernanke and 
Campbell (1988) for the decade of the 1980s in which, at least from the perspec 
tive of the popular press, there was a period of "excessive" debt build-up. This 
view can be supported from the perspective of the ratio of interest payments to 
firm cash flow. However, corporate debt-equity ratios did not change much in the 
1980s and were below their peaks attained in the 1973-74 recession. Thus, deter 
mination of whether there existed excessive debt in the period leading up to the 
Depression, for which data are not nearly as complete as are available today, may 
not be easy to discern.
15. Technical details on the model are included in an appendix, available from the 
author on request.
16. In September 1931, Britain left the gold standard. A fear of devaluation may have 
led foreign depositors to withdraw funds from the U.S. financial system. Domes 
tic agents responded by raising their currency/deposit ratios, afraid that flows of 
funds from an already-weakened banking sector could result in additional losses 
for depositors. However, just prior to Britain leaving gold, the United States held 
about 40 percent of the world's monetary gold stock, so these fears may not have 
been justified. That is, primary focus on domestic events beyond the fall of 1931 
may still be approximately correct.
17. In practice, of course, some of these loans are likely made to borrowers who are 
not constrained to borrow from banks; the data likely mix bank-constrained bor 
rowers with nonconstrained borrowers. However, we will generally interpret the 
loan series as representing bank-constrained borrowers.
18. As indicated earlier, shocks to the IS curve also may originate elsewhere in the 
world. These shocks are not considered explicitly in the model.
19. Notice that the sum of the systematic and random components equals the data 
itself.
20. Shocks from the international economy are not explicitly modeled here, but rather 
are subsumed in the errors terms.
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